Foreign Sovereign Immunity - Whether United States Embassies are Jurisdictional Territory Under the Non-Commercial Tort Exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act by Conley, Jill M.
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-WHETHER UNITED STATES EMBAS-
SIES ARE JURISDICTIONAL TERRITORY UNDER THE NON-COMMERCIAL
TORT EXCEPTION OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
Two recent decisions by different courts of appeals interpret the
scope of the non-commercial tort exception of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA). 1 The facts of the two cases
were virtually identical. Plaintiffs,2 former hostages at the United
States embassy in Iran,' sued the Islamic Republic of Iran for per-
sonal damages suffered as a result of their captivity in United
States district courts. In one case the United States was joined as
a party defendant;5 in the other the United States intervened as a
defendant pursuant to an agreement with Iran.' In both cases the
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
Plaintiffs in Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-00230 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1981),
were Gregory Allen Persinger, a Marine guard at the United States embassy in Tehran, and
his parents. Plaintiffs in McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 81-0931, 81-5108, 81-5109,
81-5274, 81-5482 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1981), were several former hostages and the wives of
two former hostages.
I On November 4, 1979, the United States embassy in Tehran was seized by Iranian mili-
tant students. The embassy personnel were detained by the militants with the tacit ap-
proval of the Iranian Government for 444 days. For general discussions of the detention of
the embassy personnel, see R. MCFADDEN, J. TREASTER & M. CARROLL, No HIDING PLACE
(1981); M. LEDEEN & W. LEWIS, DEBACLE (1981); K. KOOB, GUEST OF THE REVOLUTION (1982);
P. SALINGER, AMERICA HELD HOSTAGE: THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS (1981).
' Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-00230 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1981). McKeel v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 81-0931, 81-5108, 81-5109, 81-5274, 81-5482 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
20, 1981). District courts have original jurisdiction of civil actions involving foreign states for
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
' McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 81-0931, 81-5108, 81-5109, 81-5274, 81-5482
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1981). Plaintiffs argued that they had a valid claim against the United
States for taking property without just compensation. Id.
' Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan.
19, 1981, 81 DEP'T ST. BULL. 1 (Feb. 1981), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 224 (1981)[hereinafter
cited as Declaration]. The Declaration settled the hostage situation between the United
States and Iran with the government of Algeria acting as arbitrator. The United States
agreed, in return for release of the hostages, not to interfere in Iranian affairs, to return
Iranian assets, to nullify trade sanctions imposed on Iran, and to withdraw all pending
claims and bar all future claims against Iran arising out of the hostage taking. Id. at 2-3, 20
I.L.M. at 224-48. President Carter promulgated a series of executive orders to implement the
Declaration. Executive Orders 12,276-85, 46 Fed. Reg. 79,123 (1981). reprinted in 20 I.L.M.
286 (1981). President Reagan ratified these orders on February 24, 1981. Executive Order
12,294, 46 Fed. Reg. 14,111 (1981). To enforce the agreement barring future claims, the
United States intervened in Persinger. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-00230
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1981). The United States also filed a Statement of Interest in order to
fulfill its obligations under the agreement. American Group Int'l, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
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United States moved to dismiss the complaints for lack of jurisdic-
tion7 and the district courts granted the motions.8 Plaintiffs ap-
pealed. In the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia, held: Iran was not immune from suit because this situation fell
within one of the exceptions of the FSIA.9 In the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, held: the exception did not apply and Iran was
immune from suit. 10 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 690
F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1982), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 404 (1983) reh'g
Iran, 657 F.2d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
' The United States argued that the district courts lacked jurisdiction over Iran because
Iran was immune from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976). Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-00230 (D.D.C. Aug.
24, 1981). McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 81-0931, 81-5108, 81-5109, 81-5274, 81-
5482 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1981).
8 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-00230 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1981). McKeel v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 81-0931, 81-5108, 81-5109, 81-5274, 81-5482 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
20, 1981). Relying on Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the District Court for
the District of Columbia also held that the President had wide latitude during international
crises to settle private claims. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-00230 (D.D.C.
Aug. 24, 1981). In Dames & Moore, the Court relied on the President's power to make exec-
utive agreements without the advice and consent of the Senate and congressional ac-
quiesence in the President's power to settle claims. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680-83.
Other claims by hostages and their families have been dismissed by the District Court for
the District of Columbia for lack of jurisdiction. See Williams v. Islamic Republic of Iran,
No. 79-3295 (D.D.C.), and Lauterbach v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 81-0350 (D.D.C.)
(opinion in consolidated cases, June 11, 1981), aff'd in Nos. 81-1672, 81-1676 (D.C. Cir. Oct.
19, 1982); Moeller v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 80-1171 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 1981) (no appeal
taken). The District Court for the Central District of California held that there was no basis
for jurisdiction over Iran under either federal question or diversity jurisdiction. McKeel v.
Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 81-0931, 81-5108, 81-5109, 81-5274, 81-5482 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
20, 1981).
1 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 690 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1982), reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 404, 412 (1983) reh'g granted. The opinion of the court was not printed in the Federal
Reporter at the court's request. Id. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia also
held that the executive orders implementing the Declaration were not an attempt to change
the subject matter jurisdiction of any court because the orders were addressed to people, not
to courts. 22 I.L.M. at 410. Further, the court agreed with the District Court that the Decla-
ration and executive orders implementing it extinguished plaintiffs' claims against Iran. Id.
at 418. In reaching this decision, the court placed great emphasis on the tacit congressional
approval of the President's action evidenced by Congress' failing to enact any legislation
either condemning the agreement or reinstating the claims. Id. at 416. As the court pointed
out, Congress had even enacted a bill to provide compensation to the former hostages. Id.
Thus, the final result of the case was that while the FSIA was not a bar to plaintiffs' action,
the settlement Declaration precluded the court from granting relief in this case.
"0 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983). The Ninth Circuit also held that the proper forum for
plaintiffs' claim against the United States was the United States Claims Court. Id. More-
over, the Ninth Circuit declined to transfer plaintiffs' claim to the Claims Court because
plaintiffs could refile their claim themselves. Id.
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granted.1 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-
5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117, 82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983).
The FSIA' 2 provides, subject to certain express statutory excep-
tions and existing international agreements, 3 that a foreign state
" The United States petitioned for rehearing contending that the court of appeals had
construed the FSIA incorrectly and that construction would only complicate handling diplo-
matic relations. Petition for Rehearing the Court's Construction of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, filed Nov. 22, 1982, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 419 (1983)[hereinafter cited as
United States Petition]. This petition was granted on December 23, 1983; oral arguments
were heard on May 19, 1983. Id. at 419.
" FSIA §§ 1602-1611 (1976). The principle of foreign sovereign immunity holds that for-
eign states are not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of other states. See generally L.
HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 490-
524 (1980) [hereinafter cited as L. HENKIN](traces the development of the principle of sover-
eign immunity from The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)
through the FSIA). See also J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
(1963). Originally, this immunity was considered absolute. L. HENKIN, supra, at 490. The
United States first recognized this "classical" theory more than 170 years ago in The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), where the Supreme Court
held that, absent waiver, a foreign state was absolutely immune from suit for any act com-
mitted by its agents or instrumentalities. Id. But see R. LILLICH, THE PROTECTION OF FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT 5-6 (1965)(expressing the view that Justice Marshall did not intend for his
opinion to be used as support for the classical theory). Later, a more restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity emerged which held that a foreign state's governmental (public) activi-
ties were immune but its commercial (private) activities were not. Weber, The Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning & Effect, 3 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 1, 18 (1976). The restrictive theory emerged due to increased commercial activity by
states and demands for greater state responsibility. Id. One of the principle problems with
the restrictive theory, however, has been the inability to adequately define the distinction
between public and private activities and, therefore, the inability to apply the theory. See
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 220, 222-26 (1951). See also J. SWEENEY, supra, at 20-23. The restrictive theory was
adopted by the United States Department of State with the "Tate Letter" of May 19, 1952.
26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952). This was a letter addressed to Attorney General Philip B.
Perlman from the State Department's Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate which traced the history
of the "newer" or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and announced the State Depart-
ment's intention to apply this theory to future questions on the availability of sovereign
immunity. Id. at 984-85. The Tate Letter, however, failed to correct the major problem with
the restrictive theory; it did not define the distinction between public and private activity.
For a discussion of the shortcomings of the Tate Letter, see Lowenfield, Claims Against
Foreign States-A Proposal for Reform of U.S. Law, 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 901, 907-08 (1969).
The restrictive theory was codified in the FSIA §§ 1602-1611. See also H.R. REP. No. 1487,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604 (discus-
sion of the codification of the restrictive theory) [hereinafter cited as House Report]. The
House Judiciary Committee, in analyzing the FSIA, reported "[this] bill will codify the so-
called 'restrictive' principle of sovereign immunity, as presently recognized in international
law." Id. at 7, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6604-05.
3 The five exceptions in § 1605(a)(5) are: 1) no immunity when the foreign state has
either explicitly or implicitly waived it; 2) no immunity when the foreign state engages in
commercial 'activity either occurring in the United States or having direct effects in the
United States; 3) no immunity when rights in property are taken in violation of interna-
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is immune from the jurisdiction of the United States courts.1 4 The
non-commercial tort exception in FSIA section 1605(a)(5) allows
United States courts to assert jurisdiction when a claim for dam-
ages against a foreign state arises out of a "personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property occurring in the United
States."", "United States" is defined as "all territory and water
.. . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States." 6 Until
Persinger and McKeel, however, it was unclear whether United
States embassies were encompassed by this definition.
European courts which have litigated the issue of whether the
receiving state or the sending state has jurisdiction over embassies,
have uniformly held that such jurisdiction lies with the receiving
state. 7 United States courts, however, had not addressed the ques-
tion directly. Two district court opinions suggested that the non-
commercial tort exception applies only to acts which occur within
the geographic territory of the United States. In Matter of Sedco,
Inc., Sedco, an offshore drilling corporation, attempted to sue
Pemex, a subsidiary of the Government of Mexico, for property
damage arising out of an oil well drilling disaster which had oc-
tional law; 4) no immunity when the litigation concerns rights in real estate or in inherited
gift property in the United States; and 5) no immunity for personal injury, wrongful death,
or property damage arising out of a tort committed in the United States. FSIA § 1605(a)(1)-
(5).
Section 1604 of the bill as proposed included future as well as existing international agree-
ments. House Report, supra note 12, at 10, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6608.
During committee debate on the bill, the reference to "future" agreements was deleted. Id.
It had been included in the proposed bill because of the belief that sovereign immunity
might become the subject of an international convention. Id. The committee thought this
language unnecessary because, under article VI of the Constitution, such a convention would
take precedence over any statute. Id. The committee also thought the language misleading
because it seemed to authorize a future international agreement. Id.
14 FSIA § 1604 (1976).
Id. § 1603(c) (emphasis added).
Id. ("The 'United States' includes all territory and waters, continental or insular, sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States."). The House Report does not provide any
additional clarification. See House Report, supra note 12, at 16.
17 See, e.g., Consul Barat v. Ministere Public, 15 ANN. DIG. PUB. INT'L L. CASES 311
(1948)(adoption under California law of a French child by United States citizens in the
United States embassy in Paris declared void; United States embassy in Paris is in French
territory and French adoption procedures govern); Afghan Embassy Case, 7 ANN. DIG. PUB.
INT'L L. CASES 385 (1934)(Afghani prosecuted in Germany for murder of Afghan minister in
Afghani embassy in Germany; no extraterritoriality to defeat German jurisdiction); Status
of Legation Building Cases, 5 ANN. DIG. PuB. INT'L L. CASES 305 (1929-30)(German unem-
ployment statute predicated eligibility for compensation on employment "in Germany"; em-
ployee of German embassy in London ineligible because was not employed "in Germany").
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curred off the coast of Mexico."8 Plaintiff argued that for the non-
commercial tort exception to apply, the tort could occur in whole
or in part in the United States. If the acts or omissions cause di-
rect effects in the United States, the tort occurs in part in the
United States. 9 The District Court for the Southern District of
Texas, holding that the non-commercial tort exception was inap-
plicable, concluded that "although the exception does apply to all
non-commercial torts committed in this country, . . . the tort, in
whole, must occur in the United States. ' 20 An even narrower inter-
pretation of the exception was given in Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic. 21 Hanoch Tel-Oren concerned wrongful death and
personal injury actions arising out of an attack in Israel on a bus
containing citizens of and visitors to Israel.2 2 In holding that the
non-commercial tort exception did not apply, the court stated that
ti... it is undoubted that sovereign immunity is still in effect for
tort claims unless injury or death occurs within American bor-
ders. ' 23 The Sedco and Hanoch Tel-Oren incidents, however, both
occurred within the exclusive jurisdiction of other countries and
did not concern any question of concurrent United States jurisdic-
tion or, more particularly, jurisdiction of United States embassies.
In Persinger, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that for jurisdiction under the FSIA, the phrase "in the United
States" includes United States embassies abroad.24 In reaching this
conclusion, the Persinger court followed a three pronged analysis.
1" 543 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Tex. 1982). This case involved litigation arising out of "history's
worst offshore drilling disaster." Id. at 572. Sedco also alleged that the court had jurisdiction
over Pemex under the commercial activity exception of § 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. Id. at 564.
The court rejected this ground for jurisdiction, holding that the drilling was not a commer-
cial activity but an attribute of sovereignty-control over the foreign state's mineral re-
sources. Id. at 566.
19 Id. at 567.
20 Id. (emphasis added). The language "in this country" suggests United States territory.
In addition to allowing Pemex's motion to dismiss, the district court denied the motion to
dismiss made by Permago, a non-governmental Mexican drilling company, on the ground
that Permago was subject to Texas' long-arm statute. Id. at 567-70. The court also held that
§ 1605(a)(5) did not apply because the acts of Pemex were discretionary. Id. at 567.
21 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
22 Id. at 544. Plaintiffs alleged four separate bases of jurisdiction: 1) federal question ju-
risdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331); 2) diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332); 3) Alien Tort
Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1350); and 4) Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-11). The court rejected each of these allegations and held, in addition, that the plain-
tiff's claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 545.
2 Id. at 550 n.3 (emphasis added). The court also held that the FSIA was inapplicable to
some of the defendants because they were not foreign states. Id.
2 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 412.
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First, because the legislative history failed to define the scope of
"territory . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States," the
Persinger court relied on the language of the FSIA itself to deter-
mine the meaning of the phrase.25 According to the court, that lan-
guage does not indicate that "territory" means literally only that
territory geographically in the United States,26 but also includes
any territory abroad which is under United States jurisdiction. 7
Second, the court stated that, although under international law
United States embassies are regarded as United States territory,2 8
they are not necessarily excluded from coverage under the FSIA.29
If it can be shown that the United States exercises some form of
jurisdiction over its embassies, they fall within the "territory" con-
templated by the non-commercial tort exception.3 0 Third, the
court reasoned that United States jurisdiction does not have to be
exclusive jurisdiction. The term also includes territory subject to
concurrent jurisdiction of the United States and another country. 1
The court determined that United States embassies fall under the
broad authority of Congress to regulate foreign affairs,32 that they
25 Id. at 411. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
28 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. According to the court, "terri-
tory" could have two different meanings. It could mean exclusive United States territory in
a geographic sense or territory over which the United States exercises some form of jurisdic-
tion. Id.
27 Id. The court did not explain why it chose this jurisdictional interpretation of territory.
Id.
28 Id. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 260-61 (1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 77 comment a (1965). See also supra note
17.
29 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411.
30 Id. By choosing the jurisdictional interpretation of "territory," all that had to be shown
for jurisdiction under § 1605(a)(5) was that the foreign state's tortious act occurred some-
where that the United States exercised some form of jurisdiction. See supra notes 26 and 27
and accompanying text.
31 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. The court determined that the
definition of "United States" in § 1603(c) of the FSIA was broad enough to include not only
territory under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States but also territory over which
the United States exercises concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
32 Id. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), involved proceedings to deport a person who
was a citizen of the United States by birth. The United States denied that he was a United
States citizen because he had voted in a Mexican political election. See Nationality Act of
1940, § 401, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1970)(anyone who votes in a foreign political election shall lose
his United States citizenship). The Court held that Congress had the authority to regulate
foreign relations and that this situation fell within that authority. Perez, 356 U.S. at 57-62.
See also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1935); McKenzie v.
Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915). The court in Persinger decided that United States em-
bassies were also subject to this authority to regulate foreign affairs. Persinger v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411.
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are subject to the authority of the State Department to promulgate
regulations governing consular affairs,3" and that they are subject
to the criminal jurisdiction of the United States.3 4 A fortiori, the
court concluded that the United States exercises concurrent juris-
diction over its embassies abroad.35 Thus, the Persinger court held
that United States embassies abroad are territory subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States; therefore, the Iranian actions on
embassy grounds occurred "in the United States" within the FSIA
exception. Thus, Iran could not claim immunity under the FSIA
and the court had jurisdiction to hear the case on its merits.3 7
In contrast, the McKeel court affirmed the lower court's ruling
that the FSIA barred suit against Iran.3 8 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals recognized that a literal reading of the FSIA would
yield the result reached in Persinger;39 however, the court refused
to accept such a result."' Relying primarily on the legislative his-
tory behind the FSIA, the court concluded that Congress intended
the FSIA to be consistent with prevailing international practice.4'
"That practice is that a state loses its sovereign immunity for tor-
tious acts only when they occur in the territory of the forum
state."42 United States embassies are not within the geographic
3' Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 2658,
3926-3927 (1976 & Supp. V 1980). Section 2658 deals with the Secretary of State's authority
to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the functions of his office." Sections 3926-
3927 concern the Secretary of State's authority to "prescribe regulations to carry out the
provisions of . . . [The Foreign Service] Act."
34 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. See, e.g., United States v. Erdos,
474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968).
35 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411.
31 Id. at 412.
37 Id. The court ultimately held, however, that Iran could not be sued in the instant case
because the executive agreement barred claims against Iran arising out of the hostage crisis.
See supra note 9.
38 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983).
39 Id.
'0 Id. "When acceptance of the literal meaning of words in a statute leads to results which
are absurd or futile or plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation, the legislative
purpose will be followed." United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534,
543-44, reh'g denied 311 U.S. 724 (1940). See also Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 697 F.2d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 1983).
41 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983). See Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982)("drafters intended
to bring American sovereign immunity practice in line with that of other nations"). See also
infra note 53.
4" McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
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territory of the United States;43 thus, the court held that the non-
commercial tort exception does not apply and Iran is immune from
suit."
Plaintiffs in McKeel also argued that jurisdiction over Iran could
be obtained on two other grounds - nationality and the protective
principle. 0 Nationality allows a state to obtain jurisdiction over its
nationals for wrongful acts, no matter where those acts take
place. 48 The protective principle allows a state to punish crimes
against its sovereignty regardless of the actor's nationality or where
the crime was committed. 7 The court rejected plaintiffs' national-
ity argument because defendant was not a United States citizen
but a foreign sovereign.48 The court also dismissed plaintiffs' pro-
tective principle argument, but only in a footnote with little expla-
nation.49 The court concluded that the only basis for jurisdiction
under the FSIA which the plaintiff could prove is territorial and,
because United States embassies are not United States territory,
the FSIA does not give the United States jurisdiction over Iran in
this case.6 0
Therefore, both courts of appeals address the same facts, but ar-
rive at different conclusions: one, taking a literal approach, deter-
mines that Iran is not immune from suit; the other, relying on leg-
islative intent, concludes that Iran is immune from suit. Neither
decision is entirely sound, although the result reached in McKeel
seems more logical for legal and policy reasons.
Looking only at the language of the FSIA, it is possible to con-
clude, as the Persinger court did, that embassies are "in the
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983).
"8 Id. See Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867
(1964). See also supra note 28.
41 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983).
45 Id.
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30
(1965). See also Agee v. Muskie, 629 F.2d 80 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 453 U.S. 280
(1980); United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 (1973).
'1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33
(1965). See also Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v.
Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968).
" McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983).
'" Id. The footnote merely sets out the facts of United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968), and states that Pizzarusso does not suggest that
jurisdiction should be exercised in this case.
0 McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983).
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United States" for jurisdictional purposes.5' The FSIA definition
does not limit coverage to territory under exclusive jurisdiction;
thus, territory under concurrent jurisdiction could be included.52
However, the Persinger court's interpretation ignores the legisla-
tive history behind the FSIA which indicated that Congress did
not intend for any part of the FSIA to be construed contrary to
established international practice.13 The McKeel court determined
that this congressional intent was controlling. 4 Established inter-
national practice shows that embassies are not considered territory
of the sending state, which both courts of appeals recognized. 55
Most European authorities consider embassies to be under the ju-
risdiction of the receiving state and, therefore, not part of the ter-
ritory of the sending state.56
Instead of relying upon European authority, the Persinger court
cited the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Vienna
Convention), 57 to which the United States is a party, to support its
proposition that international law has substantially removed em-
bassies from the jurisdiction of the receiving state, thus reinforcing
the exercise of United States jurisdiction. 8 The Vienna Conven-
tion, however, ateals primarily with the privileges and immunities
of individual diplomats, not with the question of whether the send-
, The United States exercises certain forms of jurisdiction, in particular, criminal juris-
diction, over its embassies abroad; thus, those embassies are "territory ... subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States," and this situation could be interpreted as falling within
the non-commercial tort exception to the FSIA. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying
text.
52 See FSIA § 1603(c). See also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
53 See FSIA § 1604 (1976); House Report, supra note 12, at 7, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS at 6605; 122 CONG. REc. 33,532 (1976)(statement by Rep. Danielson). In addition,
several Supreme Court decisions have indicated that international law, although not supe-
rior to United States law, is to be given due consideration and applied if possible. See Mc-
Culloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1936)(need for "clear ex-
pression" of congressional intent for statute to be construed contrary to international law);
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 60, 118 (1804) (laws of the
United States "ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations, if any other possi-
ble construction remains").
" McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983). See also supra note 40.
55 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. McKeel v. Islamic Republic of
Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117, 82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983). See
also supra notes 28 and 43.
'6 See supra note 17.
'7 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S.
No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
" Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. The court did not cite a specific
article of the Vienna Convention. Id.
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ing state or receiving state has jurisdiction over the embassy prem-
ises. 59 Although the Vienna Convention states that mission prem-
ises are inviolable,60 inviolability and immunity from jurisdiction
are distinct legal principles.6 1 Inviolability protects the embassy
premises from entry by agents of the receiving state, but does not
insulate the embassy premises from the jurisdiction of the receiv-
ing state.2 The Vienna Convention does not examine the issue of
whether jurisdiction lies with the receiving state or with the send-
ing state; it merely sets out diplomatic immunities and excep-
tions.63 Therefore, the Vienna Convention arguably adds little to
the resolution of the issue in Persinger and, if the non-commercial
tort exception is to be construed in conformity with international
law and practice, as Congress intended, embassy premises should
not be considered United States territory for jurisdictional
purposes.
In addition, the Persinger court seemed to confuse jurisdiction
over embassy personnel with jurisdiction over embassy premises.
This distinction is important because, for the non-commercial tort
exception to apply, the tort must have occurred on territory under
United States jurisdiction and not necessarily on the person of a
United States citizen. 4 Jurisdiction over embassy personnel may
", Vienna Convention, supra note 57, at preamble.
" Id. art. 22.
" Inviolability and jurisdictional immunity of diplomats are dealt with in two separate
articles of the Vienna Convention. Article 29 makes the person of a diplomat inviolable and
article 31 exempts him from the jurisdiction of the receiving state. Id. arts. 29 and 31. See
also E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 90 (1976).
" See E. DENZA, supra note 61, at 90-92. Denza argues that, although there is no provi-
sion in the Vienna Convention which provides for the institution of legal proceedings in the
receiving state against the sending state respecting embassy premises, under the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity, "a foreign state is not immune from proceedings relating to
land which it holds in the jurisdiction." Id. at 91. Therefore, the sending state is probably
subject to the jurisdiction of the receiving state with respect to its embassy premises. Id. at
91-92. Under this analysis, the court's finding that the Vienna Convention substantially
removes the embassy from the jurisdiction of the receiving state is unsupportable. See supra
note 58 and accompanying text. Article 31(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention protects a diplo-
mat from legal proceedings if the embassy premises are in his name and Denza points out
that a State could achieve a higher degree of immunity by putting its embassy premises in
the name of its ambassador. E. DENZA, supra note 61, at 91-92. Denza, however, overlooks
the failure of article 31(1)(a) to prohibit suit against the sending state; it only prevents suit
against its diplomats. Vienna Convention, supra note 57, art. 31(1)(a).
" Vienna Convention, supra note 57, preamble.
Although plaintiff's complaint is based on personal injury and not property damage
and plaintiff was part of the personnel of the embassy, the court should distinguish between
jurisdiction over embassy personnel and jurisdiction over embassy premises because, to be
actionable under the FSIA, the personal injury must occur in "territory . . .subject to the
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properly be characterized as concurrent because the United States
regulates some of the activities of its embassy personnel, 5 but also
requires them to obey the laws of the receiving state.6 On the
other hand, the embassy premises are subject to the jurisdiction of
the receiving state.6 7 Although the United States may have a prop-
erty right in the premises,68 this is not equivalent to a sovereign or
jurisdictional right.6 As explained by Justice Marshall in The
jurisdiction of the United States"; that is, the premises must be territory in order for the
non-commercial tort exception to be triggered. FSIA, supra note 7, § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
That the injury occurred to a United States citizen is not in and of itself sufficient to grant
United States jurisdiction. Thus, the issue of whether the embassies are territory becomes
critical.
'6 For example, embassy personnel may not invest in real estate in the foreign state. 22
C.F.R. 10.735-206(b)(2) (1983). They may not engage in financial or stock transactions. Id.
at (b)(3). Nor may they engage in any form of currency speculation. Id. at (b)(1)-(6). In
addition, children born to foreign nationals at United States embassies cannot claim United
States citizenship by birth. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1408 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
86 "An employee abroad is . . . required to obey the laws of the country in which he is
present." 22 C.F.R. 10.735-215(b) (1983). In addition, the family members of United States
embassy employees may not be employed in the receiving state, either on or off embassy
premises, if that employment violates the law of the foreign state. 22 C.F.R. 10.735-206(c)
(1983). Also, the United States will not recognize marriages performed on United States
embassy premises unless performed in accordance with local law. 7 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 358-59 (1970).
67 See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 562-66 (1942); 7 M. WHITEMAN,
supra note 66, at 353-59. The Persinger court held, however, that the United States does
exercise some forms of jurisdiction over its embassy premises citing United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973).
Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 I.L.M. at 411. The jurisdiction exercised in these
two cases is distinguishable from that envisioned by the FSIA. Pizzarusso involved a false
statement on a visa application and was brought under the "protective principle." The Sec-
ond Circuit asserted jurisdiction in Pizzarusso to protect the United States against "an af-
front to. . . [its] very sovereignty." Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10. The court did not consider
that the crime had occurred in a United States consulate. Id. Erdos involved an appeal from
a voluntary manslaughter conviction and the application of a statute which was explicitly
intended to extend the jurisdiction of the United States beyond its own territory. Erdos, 474
F.2d 157. Neither case involved jurisdiction over a foreign state for acts committed within
its own territory. See United States Petition, supra note 11, at 432.
" DENZA, supra note 61, at 75. The receiving state must facilitate the sending state's
acquisition of premises for its mission. Id. This acquisition may be a leasehold interest or
title to the real estate according to the laws of the receiving state. Id. Thus, the sending
state enjoys all of the rights incident to property ownership allowed by the laws of the
receiving state.
S9 A sovereign right is "[a] right which the state alone, or some of its governmental agen-
cies, can possess . . . distinguished from such 'proprietary' rights as a state, like any private
person, may have in property . . . which it owns." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed.
1979). See Tietz v. People's Republic of Bulgaria, 28 INT'L L. REP. 369 (1963).
When a foreign (or sending) sovereign purchases real property situated within the
frontiers of the local (or receiving) sovereign, the foreign sovereign unquestionably
acquires the ownership-the dominium-of that property (assuming that the laws
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Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, historically "[a] prince, by ac-
quiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be con-
sidered as subjecting that property to the territorial jurisdiction;
he may be considered as so far laying down the prince, and asum-
ing the character of a private individual. . . . ",70 Accordingly, the
United States, having acquired property in a foreign state, should
be considered as having laid down its role as sovereign and having
subjected itself to the territorial jurisdiction of that foreign state.71
The United States, therefore, would not have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over its embassies abroad, but only a proprietary right subject
to the territorial jurisdiction of the receiving state.
Perhaps the most serious flaw in the Persinger court's analysis,
however, is the broad effect the court's interpretation could have
on other sections of the FSIA and on United States foreign rela-
tions both abroad and in the United States. Because the phrase "in
the United States" appears elsewhere in the FSIA, the court's in-
terpretation would affect those sections also.72 For example, section
1605(a)(2) provides that a foreign state is barred from claiming
sovereign immunity in an action "based upon a commercial activ-
ity carried on in the United States by a foreign state; or upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a commer-
cial activity of the foreign state elsewhere. '7 3 After Persinger, the
scope of the commercial exception could be broadened so that any
foreign corporation run by a foreign state which has commercial
contacts on or with United States embassies could be subject to
the jurisdiction of United States courts even if the corporation had
no other commercial contacts with the territorial United States. 7'
of the local sovereign allow of such purchase) in exactly the same way, and to
exactly as great an extent, as any ordinary private person would acquire its do-
minium. However, and just as a private person does not acquire any imperium
[sovereignty over all of the land which lies within the local sovereign's frontiers]
over the land merely by purchasing the dominium, so similarly a foreign sovereign
does not acquire any imperium over the land merely by making such a purchase
of the dominium.
Id. at 376.
" 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145 (dictum).
" See generally R. LILLIcH, supra note 12, at 5-6.
" See FSIA § 1605(a)(2)-(4).
11 FSIA § 1605(a)(2) (emphasis added).
74 For example, members of a foreign country's law enforcement agency arguably could
not enter United States embassy premises to assist in quieting a disturbance, even at the
specific request of the head of the embassy, without potentially subjecting the foreign coun-
try to suit in United States courts. United States Petition, supra note 11, at 428.
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Congress clearly did not intend the exception to be so expansive.7 5
Such an extension of Persinger could hamper the effective opera-
tion of United States embassies because foreign corporations may
decide not to pursue commercial contacts either on or with United
States embassies due to the cost involved in litigating claims aris-
ing out of these contacts in the United States. 7 In addition, be-
cause the United States exercises the same type of jurisdiction
over other United States facilities, United States jurisdiction could
be extended to non-commercial torts occurring on these properties
under Persinger.77
A construction of the FSIA allowing United States courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over foreign states by virtue of acts committed
by foreign agents or instrumentalities on embassy premises abroad
also directly conflicts with most foreign states' conceptions of sov-
ereignty. 78 This could create hostility and strain relations between
the United States and other nations.79 To avoid United States ju-
risdiction, foreign states could even forbid their agents to enter
United States embassy premises, thereby making it difficult for the
embassies to perform effectively.8" The Persinger court's interpre-
75 See supra notes 65 and 66. These regulations are applicable to all United States em-
ployees in foreign countries whether they are employed at embassies or other United States
facilities. Id.
76 See House Report, supra note 12, at 13, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6612.
The exception was intended to codify the effects doctrine. Id.
7 United States Petition, supra note 11, at 427. No historical support exists for this con-
clusion, however, the interpretation of the Persinger court makes this development possible.
Whether a United States court will attempt to assert jurisdiction in such a case is an open
question.
78 Id. The United States Petition asserts that, in practice, the court's decision makes
United States embassies part of the territory of the United States for jurisdictional pur-
poses. Id. Because most foreign states consider themselves sovereign over territory within
their borders, such an assertion of jurisdiction would conflict with their view. See supra note
69 and accompanying text.
79 For example, a foreign state may perceive that such an assertion of jurisdiction en-
croaches on its sovereignty and refuse to acknowledge any judgment so obtained. See, e.g.,
British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., [1953] Ch. 19; [1952] 2 All E.R.
780 (British court rejected decision of United States district court extending United States
jurisdiction to the business affairs of persons and corporations in British patent litigation).
Thus, the United States would be faced with the difficult task of trying to enforce the
judgment.
"o United States Petition, supra note 11, at 427. The embassies would be less effective
because a great deal of business is transacted on embassy grounds. Statement of Louis B.
Sohn, Woodruff Professor of International Law at the University of Georgia, School of Law
(Feb. 8, 1984). Thus, if foreign agents were forbidden by their governments to enter United
States embassy premises, embassy personnel would have to leave the premises in order to
conduct business.
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tation, however, is unlikely to result in such action because it
would be tantamount to breaking off diplomatic relations."' In an
age of increasing political and economic interdependence, few for-
eign states would be willing to go that far.s2
Finally, the court's interpretation could seriously affect the
United States government's relations with foreign embassies in the
United States. The principle of reciprocity s3 could subject the
United States to foreign jurisdiction for United States governmen-
tal activities occurring on foreign embassy premises in the United
States if Persinger were followed. 4 This may have the same conse-
quences for effectively conducting United States foreign relations
in the United States that it could have for conducting them in for-
eign states-the United States may hesitate to allow its agents to
enter foreign embassy premises in the United States for fear of
submitting to other nations' jurisdiction. 5 Arguably, the United
States will also be constrained by its need to keep its lines of com-
munication with foreign countries open.
The McKeel court, while avoiding the potentially disastrous con-
sequences of Persinger, fails to deal effectively with plaintiffs' ar-
gument that jurisdiction over Iran can be obtained under the pro-
tective principle.8 ' The protective principle allows a nation to
reach "conduct abroad that threatens the nation's security as a
state or the operation of its governmental functions, provided...
S Statement of Louis B. Sohn, Woodruff Professor of International Law at the University
of Georgia School of Law (Feb. 8, 1984).
8" Statement of Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State and Sibley Professor of Interna-
tional Law at the University of Georgia School of Law (Sept. 7, 1983). The very reason for
the emergence of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was the increase in inter-
course between countries. See supra note 12. Countries have become so interdependent
upon one another, especially economically, that no government would be willing to restrict
its access to information from another government. More likely, a foreign country will just
ignore a judgment obtained based upon embassy jurisdiction. See supra note 79.
83 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 580-82 (1968). "The principle of reci-
procity consists in the recognizing or denying of jurisdictional immunity by one State with
respect to another State to the same extent as the latter recognizes or denies immunity in
relation to other States." Id. at 580. For a criticism of this principle, see Lauterpacht, supra
note 12, at 220, 245-46.
" United States Petition, supra note 11, at 428.
" See United States Petition, supra note 11, at 428. In addition, this interpretation may
frustrate the purpose of the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4301 (1982), which allows the
Department of State to provide benefits to foreign missions in the United States. 22 U.S.C.
§ 4304 (1982).
"' McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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it is recognized generally, as criminal conduct. 8 7 Although the ac-
tions of the Iranian militants clearly fall within this principle," the
McKeel court, in a footnote, merely states that the protective prin-
ciple is inapplicable when a more detailed explanation appears
necessary-"
Despite this flaw in the McKeel court's analysis and although a
literal reading of the FSIA might suggest that United States em-
bassies should be included as "territory . . . under the jurisdiction
of the United States," the better approach probably is that of the
McKeel court which is to exclude United States embassies from
coverage. This is because the McKeel opinion takes into considera-
tion the legislative intent in enacting the statute and avoids the
unwanted impact on foreign relations that would result if the
Persinger decision were followed. The McKeel approach allows for-
eign nations to commit wrongful acts on United States embassies
with relative impunity, but Persinger's use of the FSIA would
break established international practice and set a precedent which
could ultimately have more harmful repercussions. The Persinger
court may very well reverse itself on the rehearing because the ar-
guments for exclusion of embassy premises from the FSIA excep-
tion are persuasive. If the Persinger court affirms its prior holding,
however, the conflict between the circuits is likely to come before
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court will probably adhere to its
previous holdings that United States law is to be interpreted in
conformity with international law and practice. Thus, the Supreme
Court will most likely agree with the McKeel court's opinion and
hold that embassies are excluded under the FSIA non-commercial
tort exception.
Jill M. Conley
17 United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113, 114 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (citing United
States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968)).
" The Iranian actions threatened the United States "governmental functions" by dis-
rupting its diplomatic activity in Iran. That Iran's actions were "recognized generally, as
criminal conduct" was settled by the International Court of Justice. Concerning United
States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3.
" McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Nos. 82-5111, 82-5114, 82-5115, 82-5116, 82-5117,
82-5417 (9th Cir. Dec. 30, 1983). Theoretically, the protective principle would apply to this
situation. The House Report on the bill, however, makes it clear that the FSIA "sets forth
the sole and exclusive standards to be used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity
raised by foreign states." House Report, supra note 12, at 12, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6610.
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